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FIXING THE PROBLEM OF INCOMPETENT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Matthew Catallo*
I.  Introduction: The Trajectory of 
International Criminal Law
Since the establishment of the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, the in-
ternational order has searched for an adjudicatory mechanism to penalize 
humanity’s worst offenders consistent with modern notions of procedural 
equity.
1
The international order strives to do so by processing the accused 
through a system respectful of the fundamental due process rights priori-
tized by most modern societies.
2
While the evolution of substantive interna-
tional criminal law is certainly a cause for celebration, these procedural de-
velopments are equally deserving of praise. The procedural law—which is 
derived from identified human rights norms—ensures that the substantive 
criminal code can be applied with fairness and integrity, and, by doing so, 
gives legitimacy to the imposition of international criminal law.
3
This legit-
imacy, however, depends on the system’s ability to adequately safeguard the 
right to competent defense counsel.
* Notes Editor, Michigan Journal of Law Reform; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Michigan Law School, 2019. I would like to start off by thanking everyone with the Michigan 
Journal of International Law who helped me produce this note. For my editing team––
especially Chloe Roddy, Annemarie Smith-Morris, and Lindsay Bernsen Wardlaw––all your 
thoughtful feedback was indispensable throughout this process. Also, a special thanks to my 
former Notes Editor from the Journal of Law Reform, Nicholas Hazen. Last, but certainly not 
least, thank you to my parents for absolutely everything. I would be nothing without you.1.See
Jackson Maogoto, Early Efforts to Establish an International Criminal Court, in THE LEGAL 
REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4–22, 71–74 (José Doria et al. eds., 2009) 
(discussing the trajectory of international criminal law regimes leading up to the establishment 
of the ICC).
2. See 3 GIDEON BOAS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 13 (2013); 
see, e,g., KAI AMBOS, ROME STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY XIII (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016) (“[T]he [Nuremberg 
Tribunal] embodied the modern conviction that individuals should only be punished through a 
fair trial which safeguards the rights of the accused.”); Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 17
July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. See BOAS ET AL., supra note 2, at 13; KARIN N. CALVO-GOLLER, THE TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ICTY AND ICTR PRECEDENTS 2
(2006) (“The [ICC] is expected to play an exemplary role in the field of criminal justice and 
consequently to apply the highest, rather than the minimum internationally recognized[,] 
standards of human rights.”).
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In the wake of early attempts to provide a forum for international crimi-
nal law, the international order arguably attained its greatest achievement: 
the ratification of the Rome Statute and the subsequent establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Receptive to many of the critiques 
and shortcomings of its predecessors, particularly those relating to how the 
ad hoc tribunals provided defense counsel for the accused, the Assembly of 
States Parties strove to depart from the design flaws endemic to the ad hoc
tribunals.
4
By ratifying the Rome Statute in 2002 and creating a permanent 
international criminal court replete with a codified body of criminal law, the 
States Parties attempted to end impunity for the perpetrators of the gravest 
international crimes.
5
One of the strongest developments in that regard was 
the ICC’s principle of equality of arms.
6
The equality of arms is “[a]nalogous to fair trial guarantees in domestic 
jurisdictions . . . a fair trial requirement that is intended to uphold the adver-
sarial nature of criminal proceedings.”
7
The principle should mean that “no 
party to criminal proceedings, be it defense or prosecution, is put in a pro-
cedurally disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the other.”
8
Yet underlying polit-
ical realities complicate attaining the equality of arms, for the pressures on 
the ICC to convict offenders are arguably among the highest any court fac-
es.
9
During her term as President of the ICC, Judge Silvia Fernández de 
Gurmendi noted that these pressures have only intensified during the first 
two decades of the twenty-first century.
10
To ensure the equality of arms, an accused must be given a fair trial.
11
It 
is axiomatic that, to have a fair trial, an accused must have competent de-
fense counsel.
12
But while defense counsel competence is a core component 
4. See Maogoto, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 1, at xix; Stuart Ford, The Impact of the Ad Hoc Tribunals on the International 
Criminal Court, in THE LEGACY OF AD HOC TRIBUNALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
313–23 (Milena Sterio & Michael Scarf eds., 2019).
5. See Maogoto, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 1, at xv (“The state parties committed to put an end to impunity for the most seri-
ous crimes of concern to the international community and to contribute to the prevention of 
such crimes.”).
6
. See Michael A. Newton, Evolving Equality: The Development of the International 
Defense Bar, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 379, 387 (2011) (opining that, without the guarantee of 
equality of arms, the international criminal justice system would not be able to secure convic-
tions). 
7. JARINDE P. W. TEMMINCK TUINSTRA, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 153 (2009).
8. Id.
9. AMBOS, supra note 2, at XVI.
10. See id. (discussing the ICC’s increasing jurisdiction and the associated problems 
this will pose to the ICC’s legitimacy). 
11. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 153. 
12. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (elucidating this principle 
in the context of U.S. law).
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of the equality of arms, it has been puzzlingly neglected by ICC legislators 
and scholars, just as it was when the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) were active.
13
While much of the framework, statutory law, and 
jurisprudence from these ad hoc tribunals carried over to the ICC, it is cur-
rently unclear whether, or if, the phenomenon of incompetent defense coun-
sel manifests in the ICC to the same overt degree that it did in the two tribu-
nals.
14
To date, no ICC proceeding nor any scholarship has addressed this is-
sue. Failing to seriously consider this topic risks condemning the ICC to 
path dependence, due to its predecessors’ jurisprudential and structural 
shortcomings. Luckily, since the nascent ICC is not bound by ICTY or 
ICTR precedent, the issues of defense attorney competence that plagued the 
ad hoc tribunals do not have to be repeated.15 Unfortunately, an analysis of 
the ICC’s structure and practice reveals that this institution is also derelict in 
guaranteeing adequate, competent, and independent defense counsel for the 
accused.
16
Therefore, in order to safeguard and promote the equality of 
arms, significant reform to the ICC’s regulatory framework is needed.
Such reform may be available through the ReVision Project, a recently 
proposed program that would “reorganise and rationalise the structure” of 
the ICC’s Registry.
17
As of now, ReVision aims to diminish the institutional 
autonomy held by defense counsel at the ICC. This note proposes, however, 
that many of the issues relating to defense counsel at the ICC could be ame-
liorated by restructuring the Registry to give defense counsel more inde-
pendence. Consequently, this note proposes using ReVision to instead cre-
ate a retooled Registry, giving the defense an office within the ICC more 
autonomy and an external administrative bar association that is able to seri-
ously address pressing defense matters. This reform represents a significant 
departure from the ICC’s predecessors’ jurisprudence, but this note argues 
that such a departure is necessary given the distinct nature of the ICC and its 
role in the international order.
Part II of this note will examine the phenomenon of incompetent de-
fense counsel at the ICC’s adjudicative predecessors—the ad hoc tribunals 
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia—to determine how and why this problem man-
ifested. Part III will then analyze how the ICC strives to depart from the 
procedures of the ad hoc tribunals and ensure competent defense counsel by 
13. The ICTR and ICTY will frequently be referred to as simply the ad hoc tribunals 
herein.
14. See Ford, supra note 4, at 313–23.
15. See CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 3, at 1–2 (stating that the ICC is not bound by 
these precedents, but that they can be significantly persuasive authority). 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. Audit Report on the ReVision Project of the International Criminal Court’s Regis-
try, ICC-ASP/15/27, ¶ 6 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-
ASP-15-27-ENG.pdf. 
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assessing the ICC’s current rules, regulations, and relevant case law. Part IV 
will conclude with recommended reforms.
II.  Ineffective Defense Counsel in the AD HOC Tribunals
The lessons the international community learned from the ad hoc tribu-
nals directly influenced the crafting of the ICC’s structure, procedures, and 
substantive criminal laws.
18
Consequently, examining the competence of de-
fense counsel at the ICC necessitates a preliminary examination of how the 
antecedent ad hoc tribunals treated this phenomenon.19 An analysis of tribu-
nal scholarship, court regulations, and case law reveals that the accused at 
the ad hoc tribunals frequently received incompetent representation, a result 
likely due to a combination of the structural neglect of defense counsel’s 
needs and a reticent, non-interventionist judiciary.
There were deep structural and systemic inequalities between the de-
fense and prosecution at the ICTY and ICTR.
20
Defense teams operated with 
systematic underfunding,
21
less time to investigate charged offenses,
22
far 
fewer staff compared to the prosecution,
23
limited ability to gather evi-
dence,
24
lack of an established defense office,
25
and a significant lack of par-
ity in access to state cooperation during investigations.
26
In short, therefore, 
the tribunals’ structural design meant that the defense was dealt a losing 
hand at the outset of the proceedings.
Stemming from this lopsided structural and regulatory playing field, 
there was a notable disequilibrium between the competency of the prosecu-
18
.
Ford, supra note 4, at 313. 
19. See id. at 315–25 (describing how the drafters of ICC used the experiences of the 
ad hoc tribunals to influence how to structure the Rome Statute).
20. See, e.g., Gabrielle McIntyre, Equality of Arms––Defining Human Rights in the 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN 
J. INT’L L. 269, 319–20 (2003) (concluding that the balance of powers at the ICTY was fun-
damentally skewed in favor of the prosecution). 
21. Newton, supra note 6, at 391.
22. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 20, 2010) (finding no violation of 
equality of arms despite the contrast between the “large team” of thirty-five investigators who 
worked from 1999 to 2008 on behalf of the prosecution and the two investigators available to 
the defense for a two and a half month period in 2008). 
23. Id.
24. Newton, supra note 6, at 392.
25. Brianne McGonigle, De Facto v. De Jure Equality in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 10, 10 (2005). In contrast, the pros-
ecution operated out of a dedicated office. TUINISTRA, supra note 7, at 73 (noting that, at the 
ad hoc tribunals, the prosecution enjoyed a formal, independent Office of the Prosecutor).
26. Newton, supra note 6, at 390 (“The difference in access to international pres-
sure/leverage arguably represents the most significant structural limitation on equality of arms 
in the system of international justice.”).
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tion and defense counsel.
27
In various instances, the defense counsel’s per-
formance was not on par with any objective standards of competence.
28
For 
example, as Professor Sonja B. Starr of the University of Michigan Law 
School indicates, tribunals frequently characterized defense motions and 
briefs as “incoherent or incomprehensible, or deemed them too unclear to
merit consideration.”
29
As the President of the International Center for Tran-
sitional Justice, David Tolbert, notes, defense counsel at the ICTY were 
“generally unfamiliar with the adversarial system on which the ICTY’s pro-
cedure’s [were] modeled and . . . thus had difficulty with cross-examination 
and other aspects of advocacy.”
30
This led to both subpar representation in 
certain cases and “delays in the proceedings, as these lawyers . . . struggled 
in an unfamiliar system.”
31
Analyzing why incompetent defense counsel pervaded the ad hoc tribu-
nals informs both why the problem of incompetent defense counsel occurs 
at the ICC, as well as why the judicial framework for dealing with this prob-
lem is so inadequate. Both topics—the structural flaws that create the prob-
lem and the lack of meaningful judicial intervention in response—will be 
addressed seriatim.
A. Structural Factors Begetting Defense Counsel Incompetence
There are four causal factors that explain why the accused commonly 
received incompetent representation at the ad hoc tribunals: (1) the lack of a 
structural defense organ at the tribunals, (2) disadvantageous employment 
27. See, e.g., Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Opera-
tion and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/54/634, ¶ 210 (1999) (characterizing the 
performance of a significant amount of defense counsel before the ad hoc tribunals as very 
poor); Sonja B. Starr, Ensuring Defense Counsel Competence at International Criminal Tri-
bunals, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN AFF. 169, 174–88 (2009) (listing several tribunal pro-
ceedings that evince ineffective assistance without directly addressing the topic).
28. Starr, supra note 27, at 171 n.4. 
29. Id. at 171. Professor Starr proceeds to note that “tribunals have frequently observed 
that counsel have failed to raise potentially valid objections or arguments at the proper time, 
and simultaneously often chastised counsel for raising frivolous motions and arguments.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). 
30. David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEW 
ENGLAND L. REV. 975, 979 (2003); see also John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defense Coun-
sel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 167, 170 (Richard Mary et 
al. eds., 2001) (“To some extent, at least, trials are lengthened by the lack of experience and 
training of defence counsel appearing before the Trial Chambers. Many have no experience 
whatsoever with criminal law. Many have no experience whatsoever with the adversary nature 
of trial proceedings before the ICTY. Many are unfamiliar with the Statute and Rules of Pro-
cedure and the practice before the Tribunal that has developed through the case law that has 
interpreted and applied the provisions of the Statute and Rules.”). 
31. Tolbert, supra note 30, at 979. 
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terms, (3) insufficient reimbursement of counsel, and (4) ineffective hiring 
qualifications.
32
The predominant explanation for defense incompetence is that neither 
the ICTY nor the ICTR had a unified defense organ.
33
The tribunals were 
each structured with three formal organs: the Chambers, the Office of the 
Prosecutor, and the Registry. All matters pertaining to defense counsel were 
subsumed within the “overburdened Registry,” which was simultaneously 
tasked with administrative responsibilities and judicial support services.
34
The Registry was not in a position to advocate for defense issues or the 
rights of the accused.
35
While the Office of the Prosecutor was run by legal-
ly trained counsel, the Registry staff members, who had substantial powers 
over court-appointable defense counsel, were not required to have any legal 
training whatsoever, let alone any background as defense counsel.
36
Assign-
ing the unequipped Registry responsibility for all defense-related matters 
resulted in four distinct consequences.
The lack of a centralized office, like the Office of the Prosecutor, se-
verely limited the voice of defense counsel and stripped them of the ability 
to lobby for their interests.
37
Whereas prosecutors could impact the mecha-
nisms of the ad hoc tribunals via the Office’s formal voting privileges on 
regulatory matters, defense counsel had no way to impart their perspectives 
on these matters, which typically included funding issues, amended court 
32. For a more comprehensive exposition of these factors, see generally Tolbert, supra
note 30, at 979; Newton, supra note 6; and Starr, supra note 27. Another relevant factor is that 
defense recruitment at the ad hoc tribunals was “hampered by a comparative lack of prestige 
and moral appeal relative to prosecution work, given the nature of the cases.” Starr, supra note 
27, at 176. 
33. McGonigle, supra note 25, at 10; see Starr, supra note 27, at 176; see also Isabel 
Düsterhöft & Dominic Kennedy, How to Manage the Defence––Experiences from the ADC-
ICTY, in THE DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE 
OF THE DEFENCE AT THE ICTY, ICTR AND ICC 227, 228 (Mayeul Hiéramente & Patricia 
Schneider eds., 2016) (“[The] apparent lack of [] a crucial ‘fourth organ’ in the majority of 
international courts and tribunals undermines the importance of Defence in international jus-
tice.”).
34. McGonigle, supra note 25, at 10.
35. Till Gut et al., Defence Issues, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1203, 1225–29 (Goran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013) (“[T]he internal de-
fense offices within the Tribunals fall squarely under the responsibility of the Registrar, and 
are responsible for implementing legal aid and defence-related logistical support in a neutral 
and impartial manner.”).
36
. See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 73–74 (“The Registry administers the assignment 
of legal aid to the accused and issued the Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel; 
establishes whether or not lawyers or other defence team members fulfil the necessary qualifi-
cation requirements; provides resources to the defence; drafted a Code of Professional Con-
duct for Defence Counsel; and, monitors defence counsel’s professional behaviour.”).
37. Id. at 159 (noting that, at the ad hoc tribunals, “[d]efense counsel [had] limited op-
portunities for mentoring and limited negotiating and lobbying power”).
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rules, ethical and procedural regulations, and hiring criteria.
38
Compounding 
these disadvantages, defense counsel lacked adequate facilities
39
and re-
ceived substantially less in the way of support staff.
40
Unlike the prosecu-
tion, who did not need to pay for office facilities, court-appointed defense 
counsel were required to pay for their own office spaces near the Hague.
41
At the same time, because defense counsel were only assigned to work for 
the tribunal on a case-by-case basis, many defense attorneys also had to 
maintain their domestic offices.
42
Consequently, defense attorneys generally 
incurred double the expenses of prosecution attorneys, since most of them 
had to maintain domestic offices along with their offices near the seat of the 
tribunals.
43
Second, defense counsel frequently had to endure disadvantageous em-
ployment terms, which diminished the role’s attractiveness.
44
For example, 
defense counsel were employed on a contractual basis.
45
In contrast, prose-
cutors were full-time employees with consistent salaries and dependable job 
security.
46
Without the same benefits or job security posed by a career track, 
there was little incentive for possible defense counsel applicants to enter the 
role.
47
Moreover, most of the defense attorneys at the ad hoc tribunals were 
“first timers,” as defense counsel seldom represented subsequent clients af-
38. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1225–29; see McGonigle, supra note 25, at 10 (“A con-
flict of interest became apparent in 1997 when the Registry attempted to reduce costs by re-
stricting the maximum number of hours per month Defense Counsel could bill for fees and 
greatly limiting the number of investigators and consultants they could hire. Lacking the sta-
tus of an independent organ, at that time [defense counsel] had no structured defense associa-
tion to lobby against such changes.”).
39. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 166. 
40. Id. at 152–53 (“The OTP [at the ad hoc tribunals] always had more staff members 
than the defence. . . . At the ad hoc Tribunals, a maximum of two defense counsel can be as-
signed to an accused under the legal aid scheme: one lead counsel and one co-counsel. In ad-
dition, a maximum of three support staff members . . . may be assigned at the ICTR and a 
maximum of five under the lump sum system of the ICTY.”).
41. See TUINISTRA, supra 16, at 158.
42. Starr, supra note 27, at 176.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (“Because defense teams work on a contract basis, they lack job security pro-
vided to prosecution and Chambers attorneys, who are professional-track employees.”). 
46. See id.
47. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 160 (“Defense counsel are appointed to any particular 
case, only if the accused has chosen them. Having been appointed to one case, an appointment 
to a next case does not necessarily follow.”); Starr, supra note 27, at 176 (“[D]efense counsel 
tend to be less integrated in the tribunal’s social community; they are physically housed out-
side the tribunal buildings, and some are actually based in other countries. By undermining 
quality of life and professional satisfaction, this isolation risks hurting retention of counsel as 
well as initial recruitment.”).
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ter their initial case.
48
Unlike for the prosecutors, there was no natural pro-
cess for defense counsel to learn from one another and pass on their 
knowledge; their work was solitary in nature, and, because defense counsel 
rarely worked on more than one case at the ad hoc tribunals, there was little 
opportunity for mentorship.
49
As a result, there was no sense of unity in the 
practice, and defense counsel lacked a “collaborative community with insti-
tutional memory.”
50
Third, there was a stark difference in the remuneration schemes for, and 
allocation of resources between, the prosecution and court-appointed de-
fense counsel. Prosecutors could count on a fixed UN salary,
51
and they 
were automatically remunerated throughout the duration of their assignment 
to a case.
52
In contrast, due to both their lack of steady employment and a 
different compensation scheme, defense counsel were paid less than the 
prosecution, and they lacked the same salary protections.
53
Moreover, de-
fense counsel were “only paid 70 to 80 percent of the[ir] monthly allotment 
[based on defense counsel’s contract], with the remainder being provided at 
the end of the stage [of litigation] in question.”
54
Unlike their counterparts, 
defense counsel were not entitled to additional funds if the phase of litiga-
tion in question lasted longer than the initial estimate in their employment 
contract, regardless of the cause of delay.
55
Additionally, the Trial Chambers 
at the ad hoc tribunals could withhold the remuneration for defense counsel 
for filing “frivolous or vexatious motions,” but could not withhold payment 
to prosecutors.
56
Fourth, the qualifications required to be hired onto a tribunal’s list of 
appointable counsel were notoriously maladaptive.
57
To practice as defense 
counsel at the ICTY, for example, counsel had to have “at least seven years 
of relevant experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, attorney or in some 
48. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 161–62 (explaining that most defense attorneys practic-
ing in front of the ad hoc tribunals had no previous experience working with international 
criminal law and that these attorneys rarely returned to the ad hoc tribunals after the conclu-
sion of their cases).
49. Id.
50. Starr, supra note 27, at 176.
51. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 165.
52. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1226.
53. Id.; Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal: 
Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 519, 530–32 (1997). Note 
that this assessment only applies to situations relating to indigent defendants. However, as 
Professor Starr notes, “[b]ecause of the enormous cost of defense at the international level, 
nearly every defendant qualifies for appointed defense counsel, even though many defendants 
are not poor in absolute terms.” Starr, supra note 35, at 171 n.3.
54. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1226.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1225.
57. Starr, supra note 27, at 177–79. 
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other capacity, in criminal proceedings,”
58
along with established compe-
tence in criminal, international criminal, international humanitarian or inter-
national human rights law.
59
As Professor Starr duly remarked, these criteria 
did nothing to ensure someone was competent in the laws of the tribunal, 
because the quantitative durational prerequisites did not necessarily corre-
late with qualitative competency metrics.
60
That is, “established compe-
tence” was not defined, and “seven years of relevant experience” did not en-
sure that one would have established competence as defense counsel in the 
international criminal law context. Such competence was necessary to navi-
gate the legal framework in the ad hoc tribunals, where cases were both fac-
tually and legally complex
61
and procedurally idiosyncratic due to a hybridi-
zation of the civil and common law systems.
62
The ICTR fared no better, as 
it had, by 2007, virtually identical hiring criteria.
63
B. Judicial Failure to Redress Issues Caused by 
Incompetent Defense Counsel
The judiciary of the ad hoc tribunals failed to ameliorate the systemic 
harms of incompetent defense counsel. Unlike judiciaries in various domes-
tic jurisdictions that provide, expound on, and sometimes enforce standards 
of competent representation,
64
the chambers at the ad hoc tribunals provided 
virtually zero judicial oversight for counsel’s competence after appoint-
ment.
65
Whereas domestic courts frequently define adequate levels of com-
petence and enforce them, the judiciary at the ad hoc tribunals rarely ad-
dressed incompetency.
66
From the little case law available on incompetent 
assistance of counsel,
67
however, we can glean insight into how the tribunals 
responded to parties alleging incompetent counsel.
58. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50, Rule 45(B)(iii) 
(July 8, 2015); see also TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 40.
59. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 58, Rule 45(B)(ii); see ICTY 
Directive No. 1/94, IT/73/REV.11, art. 14(A)(iii), https://www.icty.org/x/file/
Legal%20Library/Defence/Assignment_of_counsel_july2006.pdf.
60. Starr, supra note 27, at 178–79. This duration requirement is likely arbitrary with 
little basis in empirical fact. See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 42–43.
61. Mark Harmon, Plea Bargaining: The Uninvited Guest at the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 163, 174 (José Doria et al. eds., 2009). 
62. Starr, supra note 27, at 178 n.40.  
63. See ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 45(A), (June 15, 2017), 
https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/070615-rpe-en-fr.pdf; see also Starr, 
supra note 27, at 177–78 (“[M]ost ICTR defense counsel have little experience with interna-
tional criminal cases.”). 
64. Starr, supra note 27, at 186.
65. Id. at 181. 
66. See id. at 181–83.
67. Id. at 171 n.4 (listing several tribunal proceedings that evince ineffective assistance 
without directly addressing the topic).
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At the ad hoc tribunals, defendants could request relief from incompe-
tent counsel in two ways. First, the accused could request the withdrawal of 
counsel. In order to achieve this, the accused had to prove the existence of 
“exceptional circumstances” such as the complete breakdown of communi-
cation with the accused’s attorney.
68
However, the tribunals were markedly 
reluctant to accede to such requests,
69
likely due to concerns that an accused 
was intentionally attempting to force delay.
70
Even if a claim was meritori-
ous, it would be categorically denied if the accused’s argument was that the 
amount of time or resources allocated to the case was insufficient and that 
this insufficiency precluded effective representation.
71
Second, an accused could move the tribunal for relief, such as the ap-
pointment of new counsel or relief from a tribunal’s holding, if they could 
prove counsel was incompetent.
72
When confronted with such a motion in 
the Tadić case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY recognized that ineffec-
tive representation by counsel was a valid appellate argument if the appel-
lant could establish the existence of “gross professional negligence,”
73
but 
noted that there was a strong presumption in favor of counsel’s due dili-
gence absent any clear demonstration of gross incompetence.
74
This became 
68. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Ap-
pellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion Contesting the Decision of the President Refusing 
to Review and Reverse the Decision of the Registrar Relating to the Withdrawal of Co-
Counsel, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 23, 2006).
69. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, 
Decision on Ntahobali’s Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel, ¶¶ 13–25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda June 22, 2001).
70. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1219.
71. See Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR73.2, Decision on Inter-
locutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds, ¶ 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia Nov. 13, 2003) (“Counsel for the Appellant claim that they may be ethically required to 
withdraw from representing the Appellant because they do not have adequate resources to 
defend him. The Appeals Chamber observes that the assigned counsel agreed to represent the 
Appellant, aware of the system of remuneration for assigned counsel, and are bound thereby. 
There has been no change in the terms of representation or in the initial agreement, and coun-
sel are required to fulfil their obligations to the International Tribunal.”).
72. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1219; TUINISTRA, supra note 7, at 48.
73. Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for 
the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence ¶¶ 46–50 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 15, 1998). 
74. Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, supra note 73, at ¶¶ 48-50; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., 
Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Admission of Additional Evidence, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia April 11, 2001) (“[T]here is a strong presumption that coun-
sel at trial acted with due diligence, or putting it another way, that the performance of counsel 
fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. In assessing whether trial counsel 
were ‘grossly negligent,’ the Chamber examining the allegation applies an objective standard 
of reasonableness. In determining whether the performance of counsel actually fell below that 
standard, an assessment must be made of counsel’s conduct in the circumstances as they stood 
at that time.”).
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referred to as the “gross incompetence” standard.
75
As the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber in Akayesu explained, to prove an accused’s trial counsel was inef-
fective, the accused needed to further show that counsel’s “gross incompe-
tence” resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
76
This was too onerous a standard 
for the accused to meet. As Professor Starr observed, in no explicit instance 
did an accused succeed in gaining relief due to an attorney’s poor perfor-
mance.
77
After she gathered the relevant cases, Professor Starr found that the 
chambers did not remove counsel or provide relief for the accused even 
when counsel submitted subpar pleadings, behaved negligently, or filed 
frivolous motions.
78
Further, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić declared that “[i]f counsel 
acted despite the wishes of the Appellant, in the absence of protest at the 
time, and barring special circumstances . . . the latter must be taken to have 
acquiesced, even if he did so reluctantly.”
79
In contrast, in most domestic 
jurisdictions, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not predicated on 
the defendant raising a motion during their counsel’s ineffective representa-
tion.
80
Such claims are preserved for appeal regardless of whether or not the 
accused raises an objection sua sponte.81 But at the tribunals, the accused 
needed to meet the extremely onerous standard that “‘his counsel’s incom-
petence was so manifest as to oblige the Trial Chamber to act’ sua sponte, 
and that the Trial Chamber’s failure to do so occasioned a miscarriage of 
justice.”
82
It is incredibly unrealistic and unfair to foist the burden of making 
an objection on the accused, who often have little understanding—if any—
of the law or procedure of the tribunal, independent of their counsel’s ad-
vice.
83
The record left by the ad hoc tribunals indicates that the problem of in-
competent defense counsel was prolific, yet rarely addressed.
84
One of the 
most telling examples comes from the Erdemović case. There, defense 
counsel’s poor understanding of the guilty plea concept and of international 
75. See CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 3, at 165 n.724.
76. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, ¶ 77 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Rwanda June 1, 2001).
77. Starr, supra note 27, at 181–82. However, Professor Starr added that “it is possible 
that some could have taken place confidentially.” Id. at 182 n.57.
78. See id. at 182. 
79. Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, supra note 73, ¶ 65 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984).
81. See, e.g., id. 
82. Starr, supra note 27, at 181 (quoting the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana et al., the so-called Media Case).
83. Id. (“[The Chamber did not] explain how the non-lawyer defendant is expected to 
recognize his counsel’s failings at the trial stage, or to identify the appropriate procedural 
stage to raise an objection.”).
84. Professor Starr lists various examples where counsel was acting in an objectively 
incompetent manner. Id. at 171 n.4. Throughout the numerous cases she gathered, Starr dis-
covered instances where counsel’s submissions were incoherent, illegible, or immaterial. Id.
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humanitarian law ultimately caused counsel to advise the accused to plead 
guilty to the charge of crimes against humanity, which poses a much higher 
sentence and stigma than the charge of war crimes to which he was entitled 
to plead.
85
Though it allowed Erdemović to vacate his former plea, enter a 
plea to the lesser offense, and receive a lesser sentence, the Appeals Cham-
ber was conspicuously silent regarding whether counsel’s conduct was 
grossly incompetent, even as it indicated that this issue stemmed directly 
from counsel’s miscomprehension of plea deals.
86
In sum, the structure of the ad hoc tribunals permitted, indeed even fos-
tered, the incompetence of defense counsel. In fashioning the unattainable 
“gross incompetence” standard and then turning a blind eye to the reality of 
incompetent defense counsel, the judiciary failed to counteract these sys-
temic flaws. Consequently, the accused were left with little recourse when 
their legal advocates failed to provide adequate representation. This problem 
denigrated the accused’s right to a fair trial and the tribunals’ equality of 
arms, tarnishing the credibility and integrity of the ad hoc tribunals.87
III.  Defense Counsel Competence at the
International Criminal Court
While largely modeled after the ad hoc tribunals,88 the ICC is and has 
been free to avoid many of the pitfalls that prompted incompetent defense 
counsel in those contexts.
89
Yet, after seventeen years of existence, the 
ICC’s track record in this regard is mixed. Although the international com-
munity took a proactive role in ameliorating some of the tribunals’ defects 
in drafting the Rome Statute, others were retained in the ICC’s framework 
from the outset.
90
Unfortunately, the positive gains made by the ICC to date 
fail to fully offset the design flaws the ICC inherited from the ad hoc tribu-
nals. As a result, the record already reveals the systemic presence of incom-
petent defense counsel at the ICC.
In assessing the ICC, the first section of this part will cross-analyze the 
ICC’s structural framework against the structural flaws of the ad hoc tribu-
nals discussed in Part I. This part will conclude with an examination of how 
85. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶¶ 15–16 (Oct. 7, 1997). 
86. Id. at ¶ 16 (“[I]t appears to us that defence counsel consistently advanced argu-
ments contradicting the admission of guilt and criminal responsibility implicit in a guilty plea. 
If the defence had truly understood the nature of a guilty plea, it would not have persisted in 
its arguments which were obviously at odds with such a plea.”).
87. See Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of the International Criminal Tribunals in 
Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2009). 
88. Ford, supra note 4, at 313–23.  
89. See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1229.
90. See infra Part III. 
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the ICC Chambers’ polices continue to foster defense counsel incompe-
tence.
A. Comparing the ICC’s Structural Treatment of 
Defense Counsel to the Ad Hoc Tribunals’
Of the four predominant issues with the ad hoc tribunals—(1) the lack 
of a structural defense organ at the tribunals; (2) disadvantageous employ-
ment terms; (3) reimbursement of counsel; and (4) ineffective hiring qualifi-
cations
91
—only one was successfully ameliorated at the ICC: the payment 
of counsel.
92
Unfortunately, the other three flaws still remain.
From its outset, the ICC was carefully designed to avoid some of the 
pitfalls exemplified by the ad hoc tribunals. In the context of incompetent 
defense counsel, the Court successfully dealt with the problem of inade-
quate payment of defense counsel using two mechanisms.
93
First, by giving 
defense counsel at the ICC what is essentially a salary: They are remunerat-
ed on a fixed monthly basis, regardless of any unexpected extension in the 
case.
94
This is a considerable improvement from the remuneration schemes 
at the ad hoc tribunals.95 Second, taking inspiration both from the equality 
of arms and the defective compensation system at the ad hoc tribunals, the 
payment scheme at the ICC is required to “maintain[] equilibrium between 
the resources and means of the accused and those of the prosecution.”
96
Consequently, under the current legal aid policy, the defense and prosecu-
tion receive equal pay.
97
All in all, the ICC has achieved “the most progres-
sive balance between the income of prosecution and defence staff” of all the 
international criminal courts.
98
The other three design flaws—the lack of a structural defense organ at 
the tribunals; disadvantageous contract-based employment terms; and inef-
fective hiring qualifications—are still present at the ICC.
91. See supra Part II.
92. See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 165.
93. Ford, supra note 4, at 313. At the ICTY, for example, if a phase of a proceeding 
lasted longer than originally estimated, there was no provision for automatic remuneration. 
Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1238–39.
94. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1241; Interim Report on Different Legal Aid Mecha-
nisms Before International Criminal Jurisdictions, ICC-ASP/7/12, ¶¶ 21–22 (Aug. 19, 2008), 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-7-12_English.pdf.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 51–56.
96. ICC Assembly of State Parties, 3rd Sess., Report to the Assembly of States Parties 
on Options for Ensuring Adequate Defence Counsel for Accused Persons, ICC-ASP/3/16, ¶ 
16 (Aug. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Report on Adequate Defense], https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-16-_defence_counsel_English.pdf.
97. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1241–42; William St-Michel et al., Strengthening the 
Role of Defense at the International Criminal Court: Reflections on How Defense Is and Can 
Be Supported for Greater Effectiveness and Efficiencies, 18 INT’L L. J. 517, 525–26 (2018). 
98. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 165.
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Just like its predecessors, the ICC was designed without a defense or-
gan.
99
Instead, responsibility to support and promote the rights of the ac-
cused and defense counsel was vested in the head of the Registry.
100
Like the 
ad hoc tribunals’ Registries, the ICC’s Registry maintains a list of external 
defense counsel from which the accused may “freely choose.”
101
Once se-
lected, defense counsel are assigned to clients on an ad hoc, contractual ba-
sis without any long-term assurances of job stability; they are, essentially, 
external consultants.
102
Moreover, the criteria for inclusion on the Registry’s list are compara-
ble to those of the ad hoc tribunals. To qualify, an applicant must possess 
“established competence in international or criminal law and procedure.”103
According to the Regulations of the Court, “established competence” is 
measured purely by the number of years one has worked in either a criminal 
or international law capacity (which must be more than ten).104 The disjunc-
tive formulation of this criterion misses the mark, as there is no guarantee 
that counsel who meet it will have any familiarity with international crimi-
nal law and the ICC’s sui generis makeup. Furthermore, just as under the 
tribunals’ criteria, quantitative requirements concerning years of experience 
do not necessarily correspond to the qualitative requirement of “established 
competence.
105
Counterintuitively, the ICC does not mandate any prior crim-
inal defense experience to serve as defense counsel—even for lead defense 
counsel. Defense counsel possessing “the necessary relevant experience, 
whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in crim-
inal proceedings” may be appointed.
106
The omission of a requirement for 
prior service as defense counsel is striking.
Still, the ICC was not blind to these structural inequities. The drafters of 
the Rome Statute tried to mitigate its defense-related shortcomings by be-
stowing a limited amount of independence for defense counsel: While it 
does not have a fully independent defense organ, the ICC does have an of-
fice for defense counsel.
107
99. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 518–19.
100. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, rule 
20(1) (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter ICC RPE]. 
101. Id. rule 21(2).
102. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1229.
103. ICC RPE, supra note 100, rule 22(1) (emphasis added).
104
. See ICC Regulations of the Court, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/01-05-16, reg. 67(1) (Nov. 
15, 2018) [hereinafter ICC RC]. 
105. See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1294; see Starr, supra note 27, at 177 (“[The year 
requirement] does not ensure that counsel will have gained relevant experience or skills, and 
may actually exclude counsel who do have relevant skills.”).
106. ICC RPE, supra note 100, rule 22(1). 
107. ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77. 
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B. The ICC’s Chief Improvement: 
The Office of Public Counsel for the Defense
During and directly after the creation of the ICC, there were calls for 
the new court to mimic the Sierra Leone Special Court (“SLSC”) by includ-
ing an independent public defense organ.
108
The SLSC is a hybrid interna-
tional court established by the government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations to prosecute international criminal law offenses that occurred dur-
ing the Sierra Leone Civil War.
109
Uniquely, the SLSC created an independ-
ent “Office of the Principal Defender” with the intention that the office “be-
come as independent as the Office of the Prosecutor.”
110
Tellingly, the ICC 
Committee on Budget and Finance conceded that a fourth organ for the de-
fense at the ICC would solve many of the issues facing defense counsel, yet 
it refrained from seriously considering this proposal.
111
Ultimately, the ICC 
summarily dismissed this proposal because of fears of unmanageable con-
flicts of interest in related cases
112
and unnecessary cost increases.
113
Instead, the ICC took a half-step forward by establishing the Office of 
Public Counsel for the Defense (“OPCD”) within the Registry in 2004.
114
In 
contrast to the organization of the ad hoc tribunals, the OPCD provides the 
defense with an institutional presence at the ICC. The OPCD’s primary re-
sponsibility is to “represent[] and protect[] the rights of the defence during 
the initial stages of an investigation” and to “provid[e] support and assis-
tance to Defence Counsel and to persons entitled to legal assistance.”
115
108. Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶¶ 7–12.
109. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 395, 398 (2011). 
110. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 79.
111. Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 9.
112. Id. (“Given ICC’s specificities as compared to the Sierra Leone Special Court and 
any national jurisdiction, a public defender office at the ICC would only be able to assist all 
accused and co-accused persons without any risks of conflict of interest if a new public coun-
sel was recruited and assigned for every accused person. Otherwise, since the number of situa-
tions before the Court is likely to be limited, and the cases might be closely interrelated, this 
would ultimately result in conflicting interests for the public defender representing more than 
one accused person.”).
113. Id. (“[A] public defender office providing full representation of the accused person 
would not be cost-effective in the long term, as ultimately support team members, such as le-
gal assistants and investigators, would have to be recruited so as to ensure effective prepara-
tion of the defence case. This would necessarily entail a significant increase in staff costs, in-
cluding not only the salary but also all other allowances to which the staff of the Court is 
entitled.”).
114. Dominic Kennedy & Isabel Düsterhöft, Proper Role for Defense Counsel Organi-
zations, in DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 137, 141 (Colleen 
Rohan & Gentian Zyberi eds., 2017). 
115. Masha Fedorova, The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal Pro-
ceedings, in DEFENSE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 204, supra note 
114, at 222.
432 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol.41:417
The OPCD is a laudable attempt at promoting the equality of arms. The 
OPCD is allowed to independently perform a number of duties that the ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“ICC RPE”) accord to the Registrar.
116
These duties include (1) direct representation and (2) assistance to defense 
teams.
117
Regarding the first responsibility, the OPCD counsel may “repre-
sent and protect the ‘rights of the defence’ during the initial stages of an in-
vestigation,” which may include making “submissions on behalf of a person 
entitled to legal assistance when defence counsel has not been secured.”
118
For the second, Regulation 77 of the ICC Regulations of the Court (“ICC 
RC”) permits the OPCD to provide “general support and assistance” to de-
fense teams.
119
This may include, for example, “legal research and advice 
on/assistance with the detailed factual circumstances of the case.”
120
This 
support is intended to compensate for the “lack of resources and time” 
granted to defense counsel “while ensuring the development of an institu-
tional memory.”
121
By permitting the OPCD to conduct these functions in-
dependently, the ICC grants the defense a baseline institutional stature from 
which it can manage and internalize issues directly relating to providing ef-
fective representation. In this way, and in contrast with the ad hoc tribunals, 
the OPCD represents a “milestone in improving the work of defence.”
122
C. Where the OPCD Falls Short: Independence and 
Scope of Representation
Unfortunately, however, a deeper examination into how the OPCD op-
erates, both internally and in relation to other institutions within the ICC, 
reveals that the defense still lacks meaningful independence at the ICC.
While the OPCD purports to be a “wholly independent office,” it still falls 
within the remit of the Registry, which significantly reduces the OPCD’s 
autonomy.
123
The Registrar, through the Counsel Support Section (“CSS”), 
appoints counsel after an accused selects them off the Registry’s list of ap-
pointable counsel,
124
and the Registry controls what sort of substantive du-
ties the office may independently perform.
125
This contrasts poorly with the
Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”), which is a completely independent office, 
116. ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77; TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 79.
117. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 532. 
118. Id. at 532–33.
119. ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(4)(b). 
120. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 533. 
121. Id.  
122. Id.
123. ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(2); see Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 
170.
124. Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 142.
125. Id.
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unbound by Registry oversight.
126
Specifically, the OTP, as one of the three 
formal organs of the court, is on par with, rather than subsumed within, the 
Registry, and it has “an effective voice in revising the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, the regulations of the court, the ongoing budgetary process, 
and other issues of overall policy and day-to-day operations.”
127
Defense 
counsel, on the other hand, “do not have an institutional voice.”
128
Additionally, while the Registrar is tasked with “ensur[ing] the profes-
sional independence of defence counsel,”
129
there are no mechanisms to 
guarantee this mandate is seriously implemented. For example, while ICC 
regulations require that the Registrar consult with independent representa-
tive bodies of counsel regarding matters such as the management of legal 
assistance and the development of a Code of Professional Conduct,
130
the 
Registrar is not required to take any sentiments of these bodies into account 
after consultation.
131
Defense counsel lack any means to directly manage 
such matters. Thus, while the OTP has the autonomy to decide how prose-
cutorial decisions are made,
132
defense counsel remain confined by the dic-
tates of the Registry.
133
There are other ways that defense counsel are not on par with the prose-
cution. The ICC relies on States Parties to “ensure that their domestic legal 
arrangements enable them to render a number of forms of cooperation, in-
cluding the arrest and transfer of suspects, the freezing of assets, the protec-
tion of victims and witnesses, and the procuring of documentary and testi-
monial evidence.”
134
Unlike the prosecution, which can freely and directly 
seek state cooperation requests, the defense is forced to seek state coopera-
tion requests by lobbying the formal organs of the ICC.
135
As this process 
usually entails appealing to either the Registrar or the OTP and then the 
Chambers, some have criticized this approach as cumbersome, expensive, 
126. See TUINISTRA, supra note 7, at 83.
127. Kenneth S. Gallant, The Role and Powers of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, 34 INT’L L. 21, 42 (2000).
128. Id.
129. ICC RPE, supra note 100, Rule 20(2).
130. ICC Regulations of the Registry, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/03-03-13, regs. 119, 120 
(Aug. 1, 2018) [hereinafter ICC RR].
131. See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 81.
132. Id. at 73. 
133. Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 12 (“[The OPCD] will neither be 
involved in the administrative and financial management of the legal aid programme, nor be 
responsible for the logistic or administrative support to defence and victims’ representatives 
teams.”).
134. Id.
135. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga et al., ICC Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07-444, Partly Dis-
senting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka Attached to the Decision on the “Defence’s Applica-
tion Pursuant to Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute to Seek Cooperation of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC),” ¶ 6 (Apr. 25, 2008). 
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and inefficient.
136
Additionally, the OPCD lacks the ability to decide how to 
apportion and manage the legal aid dedicated to any particular litigation as 
well as to broader defense matters.
137
In contrast, the Office of the Prosecu-
tor can determine how its resources are spent.
138
The interplay between the CSS and the OPCD is particularly bureau-
cratic, cumbersome, and problematic. While the Court directs the OPCD to 
provide legal advice, it mandates the CSS to provide practical and opera-
tional support and assistance.
139
All administrative and logistical matters re-
lating to the defense go through the CSS, which is meant to assist “defence 
teams in liaising with the other relevant sections within the ICC.”
140
In other 
words, while the OPCD is tasked with performing specific defense func-
tions, such as representing the accused during pre-trial proceedings,
141
the 
CSS governs how the OPCD carries out those functions. Since proceedings 
usually move quickly, the presence of an additional bureaucratic layer that 
requires lengthy, formal, and substantiated requests impedes the defense’s 
efficiency and effectiveness.
142
Moreover, with defense support and assis-
tance split between the OPCD and the CSS, “[t]he overall provision of as-
sistance to counsel is fragmented and responsibilities are unclear.”
143
In 
practice, the OPCD performs part of the CSS’s role, resulting in “duplica-
tion and lack of clarity between CSS and OPCD [leading] to conflict and . . .
confusion as to which office is responsible for the provision of which ser-
vice.”
144
Some examples highlight just how problematic and inefficient this in-
terplay can be. For instance, both the CSS and the OPCD arrange office 
space for defense and victim counsel.145 Additionally, both the CSS and the 
OPCD provide annual educational meetings for both victim and defense 
counsel.
146
Yet these meetings have not sufficiently addressed issues impact-
136. INT’L BAR ASS’N’S HUMAN RIGHTS INST., FAIRNESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 36, 40 (2011). 
137. Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6 (“[T]he Registrar is responsible for 
the management of legal assistance. This includes the management of public funds used to 
pay legal aid.”).
138. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 85.
139. ICC Assembly of State Parties, 13th Sess., Report on the Review of the Organiza-
tional Structure of the Registry, ICC-ASP/12/26, ¶ 7(e) (Oct. 28, 2014), https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/ICC-ASP-13-26-ENG.pdf.  
140. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 531–32. 
141. ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(4)(a).
142. See St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 531–33. 
143. ICC Assembly of State Parties, Report on the Review of the Organizational Struc-
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ing defense counsel,
147
and the ICC does not provide independent defense-
specific training.
148
Dividing these responsibilities, while simultaneously ob-
ligating both offices to provide for defense and victim counsel matters, di-
minishes the defense’s institutional capacity.
149
That is, mandating the 
OPCD to undertake non-defense related matters diverts funding and atten-
tion that could otherwise be dedicated to defense matters.
Ultimately, the OPCD’s lack of independence is a symptom of broader 
restrictions on its ability to fulfill its seminal mandates: representing and 
protecting the rights of the defense during the initial stages of an investiga-
tion.
150
For example, in the Lubunga case, a judge requested that the OPCD 
temporarily replace a defense counsel, modify a defense application for 
leave to appeal, and file its redacted version.
151
The OPCD refused, consid-
ering this to be outside the scope of its abilities.
152
The OPCD was not mis-
taken in this regard: The OPCD is precluded from functioning as defense 
counsel for an accused who is already provided with counsel, from replac-
ing counsel, or from becoming part of an accused’s  litigation team.
153
Thus, 
the OPCD must unfortunately contend with a substantial limitation on its 
ability to assist the accused during a crucial state of pretrial litigation.
The issues facing defense counsel are further complicated by their bar 
association’s inability to effectively represent them at the ICC.
D. The Lack of Sufficient Collective Representation and 
Self-Administration at the ICC
Until the creation of the International Criminal Court Bar Association
(“ICCBA”) in 2016, defense counsel lacked not only a bona fide, independ-
ent structural organ, but formalized collective representation.
154
Per its con-
stitution, the ICCBA is mandated to facilitate defense counsel’s efforts to 
obtain support, assistance, and information from the various organs of the 
Court, including establishing channels of communication and holding con-
sultations with the Registrar on matters related to counsel and their support 
147. See, e.g., TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 83 (describing one such meeting where “nei-
ther time, nor the assistance of an interpreter, had been made available to counsel to discuss 
any issues between themselves.”). 
148. Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 142.
149. See Rupert Skilbeck, Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, 1 ESSEX HUM. RTS. R. 66, 85 (2004) (“[I]t has to be acknowledged 
that it is absolutely essential for the defence to be considered on an equal basis to the prosecu-
tion from the very start, in terms of legal capacity, administrative support, investigations, pub-
lic relations, media coverage and outreach. Without this, there cannot be a fair trial.”). 
150. See ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77(4)(a).
151. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-815, Corrigendum to Decision on 
the Defense Request for Extension of Time Limits, at 4 (Feb. 12, 2007). 
152. Id.
153. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 79.
154. Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 142–43. 
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staff.
155
Moreover, the ICCBA aims to enhance the qualifications of defense 
counsel through mandatory training on substantive and procedural interna-
tional criminal law, advocacy, and information technology systems.
156
Like the OPCD, the ICCBA falls short of its potential. Most notably, 
the ICCBA, unlike conventional domestic bar associations, is only a repre-
sentative body, not an administrative one.
157
The ICCBA patently lacks 
many other abilities that many domestic bar associations have. The latter 
routinely exercise control over who is permitted to practice within a given 
jurisdiction, and they have adjudicatory bodies that enforce—by means of 
sanctions, monetary fines, and even the stripping of one’s authority to prac-
tice law—their ethical rules.
158
This is because tasks that administrative bar 
associations typically perform, such as determining an applicant’s inclusion 
on the list of appointable counsel or legal assistants, remain within the remit 
of the Registry.
159
Furthermore, since ICCBA membership is not mandatory 
to practice at the ICC,
160
the ICCBA has little influence over the Registrar’s 
appointment decisions.
161
The ICCBA also lacks a disciplinary adjudicatory 
body to enforce its putative mandate of promoting the highest professional 
standards and ethics.
162
In sum, the absence of such powers means that the 
ICCBA is, in effect, a purely lobbying body. While the ICCBA was estab-
lished to give the defense counsel at the ICC a representative bar,
163
it lacks 
many of the abilities required to address the issue of incompetent defense 
counsel.
E. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Oversight over 
Defense Counsel at the ICC
At the ad hoc tribunals, “structural flaws that reduce[d] the effective-
ness of defense counsel may [have] conspire[d] against defendants without 
regard to factual guilt.”
164
While the ad hoc tribunals’ chambers turned a 
blind eye to the issue,
165
the ICC Chambers need not, since the ICC is not 
155. Constitution of the International Criminal Court Bar Association art. 2 (June 29, 
2018) [hereinafter ICCBA Constitution].
156. Id. art. 35. 
157. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 536. 
158. See generally Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 199 (1996). 
159. Id.
160. See ICCBA Constitution art. 3(2) (“All persons who are on the ICC List of Counsel 
practicing as independent counsel are eligible to be Full Members.”).
161. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 536.
162. Cf. ICCBA Constitution art. 2(2).  
163. See St-Michel et al., supra note 97, 536.
164. Note, Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1982, 2001 (2001) (author unattributed).
165. See supra Part II.B. 
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bound by ad hoc precedent.166 So, while the ICC has many of the same 
structural flaws as the ad hoc tribunals, they could be resolved, at least in 
part, by active judicial monitoring of defense counsel competence, and by 
provisions shielding the accused against incompetent counsel. Unfortunate-
ly, as this section shows, the ICC Chambers apply the same laissez-faire 
policy to the actions of incompetent defense counsel that the tribunals’ 
chambers did.
The lack of meaningful oversight happens at two stages. First, the ICC 
has no mechanism to adequately vet whether qualifying counsel may be ap-
pointed to a particular case—the accused are free to select any counsel off 
of the ICC’s list. Second, as in the ad hoc tribunals, the judiciary fails to 
provide meaningful consequences for counsel, and relief to the accused, 
when counsel evinces incompetence.
1. Appointment of Defense Counsel
Once a counselor is added to the Registrar’s list of appointable counsel, 
“or meets the criteria to be added to the list,” the “ICC Registrar is not em-
powered to refuse to assign or appoint a counsel to a defendant . . . .”
167
This 
is true even if counsel ceases to be qualified or was never actually compe-
tent to begin with. Instead, the ICC “has adopted a self-regulatory system so 
that counsel are responsible for verifying the accuracy of information con-
tained in the application themselves.”
168
Article 13 of the ICC’s “Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel” 
(“CPCC”) provides that “[c]ounsel has a duty to refuse an agreement 
where . . . (c) Counsel does not consider that he or she has the requisite ex-
pertise.”
169
Yet this safeguard is inadequate for three reasons. First, by put-
ting the onus on counsel instead of the Registry, the OPCD, the ICCBA, or 
any other body of the Court, the ICC leaves the fair trial guarantee of com-
petent representation to the individual counselor’s possibly self-serving 
evaluations. Second, and as stressed above, the Registry’s criteria for ap-
pointment are ineffective at best and deleterious at worst.
170
Third, and relat-
edly, it is doubtful whether any given counselor could proactively establish 
whether she possesses the adequate experience and knowledge to work in 
this complex legal context, especially since expertise on the workings of the 
ICC is not a prerequisite.
171
166. See CALVO-GOLLER, supra note 3, at 1–2.
167. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222. 
168. Id.
169. ICC Assembly of State Parties, Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, U.N. 
Doc. ICC-ASP/4/Res.1, art. 13(2)(c) (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter ICC CPCC]. 
170. Supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
171. See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1292 (noting that an international criminal bar ex-
am could be required for appointed defense counsel).
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The Kony case demonstrates how this self-regulatory framework can 
engender undesirable results.
172
There, a counselor requested translations of 
English documents even though, in her application to the Registry, she 
claimed she was fluent in English.
173
When defense counsel received docu-
ments in English relating to the victims’ participation in the proceedings, 
she requested “translations into French of all documents [because] her 
knowledge of the English language [was] insufficient.”
174
In rejecting this 
request out of a concern that translation would unduly delay the proceed-
ings, the Pre-Trial Chambers left the accused without recourse from coun-
sel’s misrepresentation—or her actual inability to comprehend material 
documents.
175
In fact, there was no mention of whether counsel was compe-
tent to handle the litigation.
176
Kony in fact exemplifies each of the flaws in the self-regulatory system 
discussed above: Low appointment standards create a risk that counsel will 
not be adequately competent or adequately able to gauge her own compe-
tence.
177
After appointment, the Chambers and the Registry will hardly over-
see the performance of counsel to ensure her competence; they are content 
with summarily bypassing the issue to promote a “fair and expeditious tri-
al.”
178
This has the potential to be particularly harmful, and indeed unfair, if, 
like in Kony, counsel’s mis-estimation of her competence leads to deficits in 
representation which the Chambers fail to rectify.
179
But relevant ICC stake-
holders (the Chambers, Registry, and ICCBA) are unwilling to even discuss 
the competency of counsel when presented with a situation where counsel’s 
incompetence is plausibly impugning the fairness of the proceedings.
180
It
seems likely that because they, like the ad hoc tribunals, do not possess pro-
portional modes of relief for procedural violations, they simply ignore in-
stances of incompetent defense counsel.
181
172. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222.
173. Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-211, Decision on “Requête de la Dé-
fense en Extension de Délai Afin de Répondre aux ‘Observations de la Défense sur les De-
mandes de Participation à la Procédure a/0010/06, a/0064/06 à a/0070/06, a/0070/06, 
a/0081/06 à a/0104/06 et a/0111/06 à a/0127/06,’” 6–7 (Feb. 23, 2007) (English language de-
cision with French title).
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 7–8.
176. See Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-211, supra note 173.
177. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 49 (“But even if counsel meets the necessary minimum 
requirements [to be included on the Registrar’s list of defense counsel], this does not guaran-
tee his competence in conducting an international criminal case.”). 
178. See id. at 7.
179. Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-211, supra note 173.
180. See Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222.
181. See Starr, supra note 27, at 181–83 (discussing “remedial deterrence”).
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2. Judicial Oversight and Remedies for Defendants After 
Appointment of Incompetent Counsel
Like the chambers of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC Chambers fail to 
provide any beneficial or effective oversight for defense counsel’s compe-
tence after counsel has been appointed to a case. Essentially, the ICC 
Chambers grant defense counsel carte blanche to litigate cases notwith-
standing clear indications that particular counselors fail to comprehend 
mandatory ICC processes. As the Appellate Chamber avowed in Lubanga,
[a]s a rule, counsel is best placed to appreciate the needs of a case, 
especially the time needed for going into matters at issue in the way 
expected of counsel. The Appeals Chamber has no reason to doubt 
duty counsel’s estimation of the time required for the filing of the 
documents under consideration.
182
In Lubanga, the Chamber granted the defense’s motion for an extension to 
file “the relevant documents” because counsel arrived to the Hague and in-
terviewed her client for the first time just one day before the original due 
date to file the “Defence submissions on the scope of the right to appeal 
within the meaning of article 82(1)(b) of the Statute.”
183
The Chambers’ expectation that counsel act with due diligence 
throughout the representation is paired with considerable deference to the 
defense, a level of deference reminiscent of the ad hoc tribunals.184 If de-
fense counsel abuse their widely-allotted discretion, the Chambers may im-
pose consequences against them, but unfortunately these consequences rou-
tinely fail to provide sufficient recourse for the accused.
Counsel’s failure to act with due diligence may result in the Chambers 
refusing to consider motions filed by counsel, even if they are necessary to 
secure vital rights for the accused.
185
For example, in Katanga and 
Ngudjolo, defense counsel attempted to challenge the lawfulness of the ar-
rest and detention of the accused, which must be done in a motion filed in 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.
186
However, despite “the various opportunities af-
forded,” counsel inexplicably filed the motion in the Trial Chamber, which 
is not equipped to adjudicate such claims.
187
As a result, the Trial Chamber 
182. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-903, Decision of the Appeals 
Chamber on the Defense Application for an Extension of Time of 9 May 2007, ¶ 3 (May 4, 
2007). 
183. Id.
184. See supra Part II.B. 
185. Gut et al., supra note 35, at 1222.
186. See Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-2259, Judgment 
on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November 2009 
Entitled “Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on 
Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings,” ¶¶ 16–18 (July 12, 2010). 
187. See id. ¶¶ 18–19. 
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flatly denied the defense’s motion on unlawful detention and stay of pro-
ceedings.
188
And while improper filings also occur in domestic courts, where they 
also sometimes harm defendants, negligent mistakes in domestic courts can 
provide the basis for valid ineffective assistance of counsel claims on ap-
peal.
189
Unfortunately for the accused at the ICC, such negligence is unlikely 
to be found sufficient to support a gross incompetence claim.
190
In Situation in Darfur, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber appointed ad hoc
counsel from the Registrar’s list
191
to enable the defense to respond to ami-
cus briefs relating to the protection of victims and the preservation of evi-
dence.
192
The Chamber did this pursuant to ICC Rules of Procedure and Ev-
idence Rule 103, which permits the Chamber to appoint counsel for the 
limited purpose of respond to amicus briefs.
193
Violating the limited authori-
zation of RPE 103, the counselor in Darfur took it upon himself to address 
virtually everything relevant for the case, save for the actual amicus
briefs:
194
While he indicated an awareness of Rule 103’s scope, the counse-
lor’s legal submissions mainly related to jurisdiction and the admissibility of 
evidence.
195





Code of Conduct as a justification for bypassing ICC RPE 103, despite hav-
ing been explicitly instructed about the clear limits of his mandate.
198
Thankfully, the Chamber swiftly chastised counsel’s behavior as being 
“misconceived [in its] flagrant disregard of the provisions of the Statute, the 
188. Id. ¶ 19.
189. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383–85 (1986) (holding that fail-
ure to timely file an evidentiary suppression motion may support a finding of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel under the Strickland standard).
190. Of course, this has never been tested before at the ICC. However, such claims have 
overwhelmingly failed before the ad hoc tribunals. See Starr, supra note 27, at 171–83.
191. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-12, Decision of the Registrar Appointing Mr. Hadi 
Shalluf as Ad Hoc Counsel for the Defence, at 3 (Aug. 25, 2006). 
192. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-10, Decision Inviting Observations in Application 
of Rule 103(2) ICC REP, 4–6 (July 24, 2006).
193. ICC RPE, supra note 100, Rule 103; see Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-66, Deci-
sion on the Request for Review of the Registry’s Decision of 13 February 2007, 7 (Mar. 15, 
2007).
194. See Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-66, Decision on the Request for Review of the 
Registry’s Decision of 13 February 2007, 7 (Mar. 15, 2007).
195. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 228–29.
196. ICC CPCC, supra note 169, art. 5 (setting forth a mandatory oath to be taken by 
appointed defense counsel that they represent the accused “with integrity and diligence, hon-
ourably, freely, independently . . . .”) (emphasis added).
197. Id art. 6 (stating that “[c]ounsel shall act honorably, independently and freely. 
Counsel shall not permit his or her independence, integrity or freedom to be compromised by 
external pressure . . . .”). 
198. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-66, Decision on the Request for Review of the Reg-
istry’s Decision of 13 February 2007, 3 (Mar. 15, 2007).
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court.”
199
As 
one would expect, it did not take the Pre-Trial Chamber in Darfur much ef-
fort to find that counsel’s submissions were “frivolous and vexatious,”
200
and, as such, beyond the scope of counsel’s mandate.
201
On this basis, the 
Chamber discharged counsel of his duties and, as a sanction, withheld reim-
bursement for counsel’s work.
202
In isolation, this may have been an ade-
quate remedy. But it failed to account for the burden of further litigation and 
the ultimate risk of serious fair trial violations which this slip-up foisted up-
on the accused. Representation in Darfur was delayed for months, and no 
associated remedy was provided to the accused, irrespective of the speedy 
trial implications caused by counsel’s error.
203
The lopsided structural organization of the Court, along with a lack of 
administrative or judicial oversight, permits the phenomenon of incompe-
tent counsel to exist without much recourse. Chambers’ unwillingness to 
earnestly and explicitly adjudge counsel’s conduct as incompetent—and 
provide corresponding remedies to harmed defendants—is especially alarm-
ing. No discussion, as of this writing, has taken place about what standards 
the ICC will employ when confronting egregiously inept defense counsel. If 
reform is not seriously considered, the structural inequalities between the 
defense and prosecution will continue to jeopardize the accused’s right to 
competent representation and a fair trial, compromising the equality of arms 
and impugning the ICC’s legitimacy.
IV. Strengthening the Defense at the ICC: 
Proposals for Reform
The ICC is stuck in a state of uneasy uncertainty. On the one hand, the 
ICC’s treatment of defense counsel is an improvement over the ad hoc tri-
bunals’, principally because of the remuneration parity between the prosecu-
tion and the defense and the partial institutionalization of the defense within 
the OPCD and the CSS. On the other hand, defense counsel still lack mean-
ingful institutional autonomy and are subject to overtly bureaucratic frag-
199. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-52, Decision on the Ad Hoc Counsel for the De-
fence’s Request for Leave to Appeal the Decision of 2 February 2007, 7 (Feb. 21, 2007). 
200. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-10, Decision Inviting Observations in Application 
of Rule 103(2) ICC REP, 6–7 (July 24, 2006) (finding that ad hoc counsel had “completely 
disregarded the precise and clear scope of his mandate by adopting his own interpretation of 
the mandate.”).
201. Id. at 7 (“[G]iven the fact that the ad hoc Counsel has been acting beyond the scope 
of his mandate, the Chamber is of the view that he is in no position to demand payment of 
fees for the vexatious and frivolous claims instituted before this Chamber for the said peri-
od.”).
202. Id.
203. See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 240; see also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, supra note 35, at 217–22 (describing speedy trial rights of the accused at the 
ICC and mechanisms the ICC has employed to increase the speed of trial).
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mentation and minimization. Despite repeated calls to establish a discrete 
fourth organ for the defense, the ICC seems loath to seriously consider this 
option.
204
Even as it rejects this idea, the ICC fails to analyze the effects of 
incompetent defense counsel in practice, depreciating the accused’s right to 
a fair trial and tarnishing both the efficacy of the Court’s fact-finding func-
tion and its socio-cultural legitimacy.
205
Ameliorating the relatively ignored, yet pernicious, phenomenon of in-
competent defense counsel necessitates a restructuring of the OPCD. Any 
reform must endow the OPCD with more authority in regulating defense 
matters while simultaneously reducing bureaucratic redundancies, namely 
eliminating the bifurcation of defense responsibilities between the OPCD 
and the CSS. The most straightforward option is to establish the OPCD as a 
formal defense organ at the ICC.
206
Yet the States Parties have consistently 
denied this proposal, and nothing indicates this will change in the immediate 
future.
207
Reconfiguring the ReVision Project presents a more immediate and ef-
fective solution. While the project in its original form aims to strip the 
OPCD of independence, its regulatory framework can be amended to endow 
the OPCD with more autonomy, even as it remains under the Registry. The 
remainder of this note will turn to how this can be achieved.
A. The Infeasibility of Establishing an Independent Defense Organ
As many have indicated, establishing a fourth defense organ at the ICC 
would largely remedy and “counterbalance” the ICC’s structural bias to-
wards the prosecution.
208
Per Professor Kenneth Gallant of the University of 
Arkansas Law School, “the [ICC’s] structure could be greatly strengthened 
by the creation of a Bureau of Defense Counsel, analogous to the Office of 
the Prosecutor.”
209
It would permit defense counsel to enjoy career-based 
instead of contractual employment.
210
Such an organ would also permit the 
defense to “maintain the list of approved attorneys, train them in the special-
ized procedures, redress institutional bias and generally ‘go far toward guar-
anteeing that the right to counsel truly means the right to adequate and ef-
204. See, e.g., Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6.2 (“The costs of estab-
lishing an independent body could be substantial. Not only would there be no gains in terms 
of efficiency but there would only be a shift in terms of workload and no savings in terms of 
staff costs.”).
205. See id.; Schomburg, supra note 87, at 1. 
206. See, e.g., Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 
164, at 2004–05 (2001).  
207. See e.g., Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6.2.
208. Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 164, at 
2005.  
209. Gallant, supra note 127, at 42.
210. See Starr, supra note 27 at 190. 
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fective counsel.’”
211
To be entirely clear, if the States Parties are willing to 
create this formal fourth organ at the ICC for the defense, they should.
Unfortunately, it is increasingly unlikely that such a reformulation of 
the ICC’s structure will happen in the immediate future. This type of re-





Adopting this amendment would then require a two-thirds 
majority of States Parties.
214
Such a formal amendment is unlikely to suc-
ceed, let alone be proposed in the first place, because there is general “dis-
content with [the OPCD’s] work and doubts whether funds granted to the 
Office are well-invested . . . .”
215
Put simply, the Registrar’s current focus is 
not with giving the defense more autonomy, but less.
216
An independent Bu-
reau of Defense becomes even more improbable after observing the hostility 
this proposal encountered in the past.
217
Therefore, it is unlikely the issues 
outlined in this note could be resolved by establishing an independent de-
fense organ at the ICC.
B. Augmenting the OPCD’s Independence Under a 
Reformulated ReVision Project
Simply because establishing a formal fourth organ at the ICC for de-
fense is unlikely does not condemn the defense to institutional inferiority 
and systemic inefficacy. The OPCD can be improved without necessarily 
increasing the OPCD’s funding. By refining the framework of the ReVision 
Project, many of the structural flaws plaguing the defense may be resolved.
An amendment to the Regulations of the Court or the Regulations of the 
Registrar—either by judicial members of the Presidency or the Registrar it-
self—could streamline the rules governing the OPCD, while instilling the 
defense with more institutional autonomy. Such an amendment, essentially 
keeping the OPCD as an administrative office, would not require formal 
211. Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 164, at 2005 
(quoting Gallant, supra note 127, at 42). 
212. Philipp Müller, Promoting Justice Between Independence and Institutional Con-
straints: The Role of the Office of the Public Counsel of the Defence at the ICC, in THE 
DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE 
DEFENCE AT THE ICTY, ICTR AND ICC 245, 268 (Mayeul Hiéramente & Patricia Schneider 
eds., 2016).
213. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 122.
214. Id.
215. Müller, supra note 212, at 268 (explaining that the OPCD has never been able to 
entirely fulfill its mandate due to lack of adequate funding, which has, in turn, spurred more 
doubt about the necessity of a stronger institutional capacity for the defense at the ICC). 
216. See ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments on Draft Registry Revision 
Project Paper: ‘Basic Outline of Proposals to Establish Defence and Victims Offices’ 2–6
(Jan. 12, 2015) [hereinafter ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments], 
http://9bri.com/iba-comments-on-draft-registry-revision-project-paper. 
217. See, e.g., Report on Adequate Defense, supra note 96, ¶ 6.2
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States Parties’ ratification.
218
A similar process could revitalize the ICCBA, 
essentially transforming this bar association into an administrative body 
analogous to many domestic bar associations.
1. Exploring the Initial ReVision Project
Herman von Hebel, the current Registrar, had a similar goal in mind 
when he initiated the ReVision Project in 2014.219 This project is intended to 
“provide[] a structural framework that will optimize the Registry’s perfor-
mance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability[;] not to gen-
erate immediate significant cost savings but rather, to achieve much more 
efficient results with existing resources . . . .”
220
The project takes particular 
aim at the defense. Per von Hebel, “some of [the defense’s] functions are 
not performed adequately, there is fragmentation, unnecessary bureaucracy, 
inefficiency, and a lack of clarity in relation to the performance of Defence-
related functions.”
221
Specifically, because the OPCD and the CSS do not 
have clearly delineated obligations, von Hebel noticed that these two offices 
performed many of the same tasks, which resulted in a “lack of cooperation, 
duplication and conflicts.”
222
As this note has demonstrated, von Hebel was 
correct to lob these critiques at the defense.
However, von Hebel’s ReVision Project sought to remedy these issues 
with a superficially enticing, yet ultimately flawed approach: by synthesiz-
ing the OPCD with the CSS into a “single Defence Office.”
223
The Defense 
Office was envisioned as assuming the CSS’s logistical duties—which in-
clude dealing with requests for IT equipment, offices, travel, and interpreta-
tion
224
—but not the OPCD’s existing substantive duties, such as represent-
ing the accused during pre-trial proceedings or attending to defense interests 
218
. See ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 6; see also Hirad Abtahi & Shehzad Charania, 
Expediting the ICC Criminal Process: Striking the Right Balance Between the ICC and States 
Parties, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 383, 410–17 (2018) (observing that the ICC’s Regulations of 
Court may be amended through the Presidency or the Registrar without requiring formal 
Rules’ amendments).
219. Müller, supra note 212, at 142.
220. Int’l Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 
2016 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/14/10, ¶ 294 (Sep. 2, 2015). 
221. International Criminal Court Registry, Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of 
Recent Proposals regarding the Defence, at 1 (Sep. 15, 2014), http://michaelgkarnavas.net/
files/140954-outline-defence-proposals.pdf.
222. Id. at 2. 
223. Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Recent Proposals Regarding the De-
fense, supra note 221, at 2; see Müller, supra note 212, at 263 (“Only an office [OPCD] inde-
pendent from the Registry will be entrusted by counsel with requests for assistance potentially 
revealing confidential information, impending motions, or aspects of case strategy, or be 
granted direct access to potentially confidential material.”). 
224. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 531–32. 
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during the investigatory stage.
225
Moreover, departing from the current or-
ganizational structure—wherein the OPCD reports directly to the Regis-
trar—the ReVision Project’s new “Defence Office” would be further rele-
gated as a sub-office of the Registry’s newfound “Division of Judicial 
Services.”
226
Effectively, the new Defense Office would, counterintuitively, 
strip the defense of the little institutional autonomy it currently possesses.
In fact, under ReVision, the ICC would cease any representation of the 
accused.
227
Instead, much like at the ad hoc tribunals, representation of de-
fendants would reside solely with duty counsel appointed on an ad hoc ba-
sis.
228
The ReVision Project envisioned that a formal “independent self-
governing Association of Defence Counsel” would manage the representa-
tion of all clients receiving court-appointed counsel.
229
This body would 
serve as the defense’s administrative liaison with the ICC.
230
2. The Failure of the ReVision Project’s Approach to the Defense
The portion of the ReVision Project designed to strip the ICC of its ca-
pacity to provide court-appointed support to defendants was not well-
received outside the ICC. Defense counsel, bar associations, and judges 
were principally concerned that recalibrating the structure of the defense 
would diminish the defense’s institutional independence by taking away the 
defense’s ability to represent the accused and assist defense teams during 
the pre-trial stage.
231
Yet von Hebel considered this consolidation to be one of the strengths 
of ReVision.232 Specifically, he thought reducing the bureaucratic inefficien-
cies between the CSS and the OPCD would “strengthen the support and as-
sistance to the defence, which will benefit the conduct of the proceed-
225. Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note 
143, at 8; St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 533 (noting the OPCD’s current functions); Reg-
istrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Recent Proposals Regarding the Defense, supra note 
221, at 3–4; Müller, supra note 212, at 261.
226. Registry of the Int’l Criminal Court, Comprehensive Report on the Reorganisation 
of the Registry of the ICC, 1–2 (Aug. 2016). [hereinafter Reorganization of the Registry of the 
ICC]; Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note 143, at 
8.
227. ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 4.
228. Müller, supra note 212, at 261.
229. Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Recent Proposals Regarding the De-
fense, supra note 221, at 3.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 2–6. 
See generally Müller, supra note 212, at 261–66.
232. Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note 
143, at 4.
446 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol.41:417
ings.”
233
From von Hebel’s perspective, this benefit is so worthwhile that it 
justifies stripping the ICC of some of its existing defense capacities.
234
Unfortunately, disbanding the OPCD as an independent office would 
have two major negative effects.
235
First, since the Defence Office will not 
represent clients, the accused would not have access to “swift and focused 
assistance and representation” when in “immediate need of legal advice.”
236
Instead, the accused would receive ad hoc representation by external coun-
sel, who may not have the same expertise and whose appointment may re-
sult in delayed pretrial assistance relative to assistance from OPCD’s coun-
sel. Worryingly, since all defense counsel would be appointed on an ad hoc
basis, the defense would lose any institutional memory gained by virtue of 
having employed attorneys habitually working on similar cases with similar 
legal issues.
237
As a result, the same issue that plagued the ad hoc tribunals 
may manifest again in full: the perpetual recycling of “first timers” to take 
on extremely complicated cases governed by a sui generis procedural 
framework.
238
Second, the defense would lose its internal, institutional voice to advo-
cate for defense matters within the ICC.
239
Defense counsel, as employees of 
the Defence Office, would instead need to fully conform to the dictates of a 
subdivision of the Registry, a step further removed from being able to ade-
quately influence defense matters than they were when reporting to the Reg-
istry itself.
240
The proposed Association of Defence Counsel (or, as dis-
cussed below the ICCBA), as an external representative body, could 
ameliorate these concerns to some degree, but it is no replacement for de-
fense counsel’s missing internal leverage.
Fortunately, the portion of ReVision merging the OPCD and the CSS 
into a single Defence Office is on indefinite hold due in large part to inter-
national backlash.
241
While both the CSS and the OPDC now report to the 
Division of Judicial Services, which reports to the Registry, the two bodies 
continue to function separately.
242
The rest of ReVision has proceeded as 
233. Id.
234. ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 3.
235. See, e.g., Müller, supra note 212, at 261–66. 
236. Id. at 262.
237. See Starr, supra note 27, at 176.
238. Supra text accompanying note 33.
239. ICCBA, International Bar Association Comments, supra note 216, at 6–7. 
240. Müller, supra note 212 at 263. 
241. Reorganization of the Registry of the ICC, supra note 226, at 12 (in describing the 
newly formed Division of Judicial Services, the Registry report states that the proposal to 
amend the Regulations of Court to synthesize the OPCD and the CSS into the Defense Office 
has been put on “hold”).
242. Id. at 5. 
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planned.
243
The Registrar implemented the massive overhauls of ReVision—
such as merging all field operations into the Division of External Opera-
tions—while maintaining the presence of the OPCD.
244
While this state of 
transitional irresolution is inefficient, since the Registry is not operating un-
der one unified plan, it presents the ICC with an opportunity to correct the 
mistakes of ReVision and to tailor the project in a manner that properly re-
sponds to the issues afflicting defense counsel and the representation of the
accused. A middle ground that would resolve the most divisive aspects of 
ReVision is achievable.
C. Re-establishing the OPCD as a Division Under the Registrar
Instead of replacing OPCD with a Defence Office within the Division 
of Judicial Services as ReVision originally planned, this note proposes that 
the OPCD should become the fourth major division serving directly under 
the Registrar, retaining its current responsibilities and assuming some of the 
responsibilities of the CSS. Thus, while the OPCD would still be under the 
Registry, it would have considerably more formal institutional authority and 
independence.
In affecting this change, regulation 77 of the ICC RC should be amend-
ed to grant the OPCD full independence, not just independence in conduct-
ing the office’s substantive work.
245
The Registrar or the ICC President may 
amend the RC in this fashion without requiring formal Rules’ amend-
ments.
246
In its current form, regulation 77 states that “[t]he Office of Public 
Counsel for the defence shall fall within the remit of the Registry solely for 
administrative purposes, in accordance with article 43, paragraph 2, and it 
shall function in its substantive work as a wholly independent office.”
247
The 
proposed reform would delete the phrase “in its substantive work” within 
the last clause. Consequently, the OPCD would have a codified mandate to 
“function as a wholly independent office.”
This restructuring would create a unified body for defense counsel that 
would streamline the inefficiencies that plague the current OPCD-CSS 
framework. The OPCD would control how it appoints counsel to cases dur-
ing the investigatory stages of litigation, who it appoints to particular cases, 
how it apportions and manages legal aid, how it manages the list of ap-
pointable counsel, and how it tailors specific defense counsel training—to 
name just a few responsibilities. It would also assume the logistical defense-
243. See Int’l Criminal Court, Audit Report on the ReVision Project of the International 
Criminal Court’s Registry, ICC-ASP/15/27, ¶¶ 1–5 (Nov. 9, 2016). 
244. Reorganization of the Registry of the ICC, supra note 226, at 48–49.
245. Note that, under the prior framework for the OPCD, the office enjoyed limited au-
tonomy because it was able to have independence in how it conducted certain responsibilities 
relating to substantive litigation.
246. See Abtahi & Charania, supra note 223, at 410–17.
247. ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77.  
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team support duties that the CSS currently holds, including managing de-
fense counsel’s requests for IT equipment, training, offices, travel, and in-
terpretation.
248
The consolidated office would therefore resolve the bureau-
cratic redundancies that initially provoked ReVision, leaving a more 
efficient and unified defense division—without neutering the ICC’s ability 
to provide counsel when needed.
Notably, the newly empowered OPCD would not be responsible for 
victim participation and representation. Those duties would be transferred to 
the Division of Judicial Services, the Detention Section, the Language Ser-
vices Section, the Information Management Services Section, and the Court 
Management Section, respectively.
249
These sections oversee logistical and 
administrative functions vis-à-vis court proceedings.
250
Keeping victim ser-
vices largely under the Division of Judicial Services would fit its mission, 
and the CSS could accordingly be eliminated since all of its prior responsi-
bilities relating to victim matters would be transfer to other sections (and all 
of its defense responsibilities would be transferred to the OPCD). Conse-
quently, though decreasing spending for defense matters was not a goal of 
ReVision,251 it is noteworthy that this proposal is budget-neutral: OPCD’s 
defense representation remains funded due to the ongoing hold on the de-
fense-specific portion of ReVision,252 and the money currently allocated to 
CSS would be re-allocated right alongside its responsibilities.
D. Empowering the ICCBA to Function as an Administrative Bar
When von Hebel proposed the creation of the Association of Defence 
Counsel to act as an external bar association in 2014, the ICC lacked any 
similarly structured defense bar.
253
Since 2016 defense counsel at the ICC 
have had access to an external, independent representational body in the 
form of the ICCBA.
254
While there are problems with the current structure
of the ICCBA, these issues would be resolved if the ICCBA became more 
like a domestic bar association—imposing a mandatory bar exam and regu-
248. St-Michel et al., supra note 97, at 532. 
249. See Reorganization of the Registry of the ICC, supra note 226, at 49.
250. Id. at 110–11.
251. Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, supra note 
143, at 1–2. 
252. Id. at 24.
253. As stated above, the ReVision Project was instituted in 2014. Proposed Programme 
Budget for 2016 of the International Criminal Court, supra note 220, at 79. The establishment 
of the ICCBA came in July 2016 and its recognition by the Assembly of States Parties came 
in November 2016. INT’L CRIM. CT. BAR ASS’N, About Us, https://www.iccba-
abcpi.org/aboutus (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
254. The lack of an external, independent representational body was a major reason an-
imating von Hegel’s ReVision project. See Registrar ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Re-
cent Proposals Regarding the Defense, supra note 221, at 3–4. Thus, the ICCBA would satisfy 
one of von Hegel’s desires to create an external body for the representation of defense matters. 
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lating membership—and if the ICCBA had a codified relationship with the 
newly elevated OPCD.
255
To the first point, the ICC should mandate that, in order to be appointa-
ble, defense counsel become members of the ICCBA. The ICCBA could 
then vet appointable counsel by imposing a required bar examination and 
application process to ensure adequate employment qualifications for list 
counsel.
256
To effectuate this, regulations 75 and 76 of the ICC Regulations 
of Court should both be amended to provide that counsel can only be ap-
pointed to represent an accused if they are active members of the ICCBA.
257
Importantly, the criteria currently imposed by the Registrar in ICC RPE 
22 would not be amended themselves, only supplemented.
258
Thus, the actu-
al requirements for appointable counsel would still revolve around the crite-
ria stipulated by the Registrar—that counsel have “established competence 
in international or criminal law.”
259
To amend these criteria directly would, 
unfortunately, require ratifications by the States Parties.
260
However, de-
manding that defense counsel pass a bar exam focusing on international 
criminal law and procedure would accomplish a similar end, rendering the 
ICCBA and the OPCD better poised to address the issue of incompetent de-
fense counsel.
An ICCBA bar exam would provide a more effective baseline for de-
termining competency with international criminal law than the Registrar’s 
current criteria alone, as it would mandate familiarity with the basic proce-
dural concepts underlying the ICC’s adjudicatory process, such as plea bar-
gaining.
261
Such an exam could, of course, test only basic competence to re-
frain from discriminating against counsel hailing from jurisdictions 
completely dissimilar to the ICC, such as those that do not engage in adver-
sarial cross-examination. That said, the procedural and statutory law that 
255. It should be noted that creating the Association of Defense Counsel and dissolving 
the ICCBA would serve the same effect if the former comported with the recommendations 
proposed in this section.  
256. See TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 46 (arguing that a bar exam “should be introduced”
at the ICC to “guarantee[] that [counsel] is abreast of the legal issues involved in international 
criminal cases upon his assignment to any particular case”).
257. See ICC RC, supra note 104, regs. 75, 76.




Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng, Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
Rule 22(1) (2013); Müller, supra note 212, at 245–68.
260. Müller, supra note 212, at 142–62. As discussed supra at 34–36, such an endeavor 
seems infeasible at present.
261. Without such a procedure, it is foreseeable that counsel may not possess the ade-
quate familiarity with procedural concepts frequently used in international criminal law. 
Speaking directly to plea bargaining, in Erdemović, the defendant was permitted to withdraw 
his guilty plea because neither his attorney lacked any comprehension about the concept of 
pleading guilty. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi , Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and 
Judge Vohrah, supra note 85, ¶¶ 16–18.
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makes the ICC a sui generis court would certainly be fair game, and the ex-
am could predominantly focus on the Rome Statute itself, along with the 
ICC RPE.
To assuage the inherent disadvantage some counsel may face during the 
exam due to their domestic legal customs, the OPCD could supplement the 
exam with alternative screening procedures, following in the footsteps of 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”). In exceptional situations, this 
supplemental procedure could even completely supplant the bar exam. The 
STL’s internal Admission Panel, which resides within a specific defense or-
gan
262
conducts interviews to determine whether a defense counsel applicant 
possesses the requisite “experience and competence in criminal law or in-
ternational criminal law.”
263
Additionally, as a condition for appointment to 
any case, the STL mandates that defense counsel undertake compulsory 
training in certain legal areas, such as international criminal procedure.
264
These training requirements could be implemented if regulation 76 of the 
ICC RC, which provides the criteria governing the appointment of coun-
sel,
265
were amended to bestow upon the OPCD the ability to impose addi-
tional prerequisites for the appointment of counsel in particular cases.
266
While becoming a member of the ICCBA would be more demanding 
than before, such a shift is necessary to impose meaningful criteria for at-
torney competence before attorneys are appointed to a case.267 As we have 
seen, the Chambers are loath to provide meaningful supervision of counsel 
competence.
268
Solving this issue at the outset requires more effective stand-
ards for vetting who can become appointed as defense counsel.
269
Moreover, 
the obligation to take a bar examination to practice in domestic jurisdictions 
is an accepted reality.
270
Practicing in front of the ICC ought to be treated no 
less stringently than moving between domestic jurisdictions, and thus im-
posing a bar exam for attorneys at the ICC is neither a surprising nor an 
262. The STL is the only international adjudicative body in which the defense currently 
has an official organ. Kennedy & Düsterhöft, supra note 114, at 139. 
263. Special Trib. for Leb., STL/BD/2009/03/REV.5, Directive on the Assignment of 
Defense Counsel, rule 9(D) (2016).
264. Special Trib. for Leb., STL-BD-2009-01-REV.8, Rules of Procedures & Evidence, 
rule 58(C) (2016).
265. ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 76.
266
.
While the ICC RC could be amended without States Parties ratification, the core 
criteria for the appointment of list counsel would also require an amendment to the ICC RPE, 
which would require ratification. See Müller, supra note 212, at 245.
267. See Starr, supra note 27, at 177–78, 195–205. 
268. See supra Part III.E.
269. See Starr, supra note 27, at 177–78, 195–205. 
270. See e.g. Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality 
of Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 143–44 (2004) 
(discussing the bar exam requirements forced upon practicing lawyers wishing to practice law 
in other states in the United States, i.e., states for which the lawyers do not possess a bar certi-
fication).
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overly exacting requirement. As Professor Starr notes, “[g]enerally, domes-
tic bars do not automatically admit foreign lawyers on the basis of admis-
sion to practice and experience in their home countries. Instead, most do-
mestic bars demand some showing of competency within the legal system in 
which the lawyer is seeking to practice.”
271
Similarly demanding a showing 
of some competency with the ICC’s complicated legal framework fits com-
fortably within this tradition.
After an individual gains ICCBA membership, the ICCBA should per-
form ongoing monitoring to confirm that counsel is providing effective rep-
resentation to the accused. Such performance reviews would follow the 
precedent of the STL, looking to an individual’s track record when practic-
ing in front of the ICC,
272
and the ICCBA would consult with past clients to 
consider client satisfaction and seek reviews from other members of the de-
fense team, or even those working for the judiciary. Depending on the re-
sults of such reviews, the ICCBA could require individualized legal 
coursework to address possible deficiencies. In the same vein as rule 57(G) 
of the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
273
an amended regulation 76 
of the ICC RC could provide that the ICCBA is authorized to conduct both 
pre-appointment and ongoing performance reviews. ICC RC Regulation 76 
could mimic STL Rule 57(G), which states that the Head of the Defense Of-
fice may impose sanctions on defense counsel if they fail to provide ade-
quate assistance.
274
This recalibration would better allow the OPCD and 
ICCBA to determine the professional caliber and set the professional culture 
of the defense bar.
Notably, once membership in the ICCBA is mandatory, it would largely 
be self-funding; since membership at the ICCBA would become mandatory, 
membership fees should represent a significant source of the organization’s 
funding.
275
By placing the duty to represent the defense in a body that is not 
subject to the funding pressures at the ICC, the ICC should be able to real-
locate the funds currently spent on the internal representation of defense 
matters to different divisions. This would make the overall proposal more 
politically appealing.
Making ICCBA membership mandatory would also codify the 
ICCBA’s institutional significance. While the OPCD would handle all the 
defense-related legal matters for which it and the CSS are currently respon-
sible in discussions with the Registry, the ICCBA could expand its repre-
271. Starr, supra note 27, at 178. 
272. Special Trib. for Leb., STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8, Rules of Procedure & Evidence, 
rule 57(G) (2016) (mandating that, once counsel is appointed to represent a defendant, the 
head of the Defense Office conducts ongoing screenings to both assist counsel and determine 
whether the provided representation meets the governing standards of effectiveness).
273. Id.
274. Special Trib. for Leb., STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8, Rules of Procedure & Evidence, 
rule 57(H) (2016).
275. INT’L CRIM. CT. BAR ASS’N, About Us, supra note 253.
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sentative role to represent defense counsel interests in front of other organs 
and committees of the Court. This representative association between the 
ICCBA and the OPCD should be codified in regulation 77 of the ICC RC, 
which created the OPCD.
276
The regulation could provide that the OPCD 
shall consult with the ICCBA, and the latter shall have responsibility to ad-
vocate for defense matters by lobbying the ICC’s rulemaking and adminis-
trative organs. Codification would give the ICCBA more institutional au-
thority, which would be valuable when it deals with the other bodies of the 
ICC.
This proposal is intended as a pragmatic remedy to the current impasse 
between von Hegel’s ReVision Project and the OPCD. As such, this pro-
posal cannot address all of the flaws currently present in the ICC’s system 
of defense. Under this reorganization, there would still be no career-tracked 
defense attorneys.
277
After the pre-trial stage, defense counsel would still be 
appointed on an ad hoc basis, even as OTP continues to use a staff attorney 
model.
278
However, list counsel would be further vetted by a required bar 
exam along with ongoing, individualized performance assessments. This 
compromise is responsive to budgetary concerns on the one hand—as it 
would not require the OPCD to depart from the cost-effective ad hoc ap-
pointment structure—and competency concerns on the other, since the ap-
pointment of counsel would depend on both quantitative years of experience 
and qualitative competency metrics.
V.  Conclusion
The success of the ICC will not be determined by the number of its 
convictions but rather by its adherence to fairness in the face of gross viola-
tions of international criminal law.
279
It is in this pursuit of due process that 
the professionalism and performance of defense counsel will be the “most 
determinative dimension for evaluating the overall fairness of what is com-
monly considered ‘justice’ for grievous atrocities.”
280
By pursuing the re-
formative measures outlined in this note, the ICC will begin to right some of 
the wrongs of the ad hoc tribunals.
276. See ICC RC, supra note 104, reg. 77; see also Müller, supra note 212, at 246–47.
277. TUINSTRA, supra note 7, at 160. 
278. Id.
279. See Sara Siebert, The Pull of Criminal Law and the Push of Human Rights: Chal-
lenges in the International Criminal Process, 11 IRISH STUDENT L. REV. 29, 36 (2003) (quot-
ing Richard J. Goldstone, Address before the Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 
CEELI Leadership Award Dinner (Oct. 2, 1996)) (“There is no question that history will 
judge the Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the fairness or unfairness of 
their proceedings. Whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be the 
yardstick. The measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings.”).
280. Newton, supra note 6, at 380. 
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While the ReVision Project rightly strives to eliminate the bureaucratic 
inefficiencies hampering the management of defense counsel, its proposals 
would both further strip the defense of the independence that it needs and 
denigrate the equality of arms. Relegating the defense to institutional insig-
nificance is simply an untenable option given the Court’s permanence. 
Turning a blind eye to defense matters risks obviation of the ICC’s legiti-
macy in both contemporary society and future generations. However, curing 
defense counsel incompetence requires a serious attempt at bestowing the 
OPCD with actual independence. Reconstituting the OPCD as an independ-
ent office under the Registry while codifying the ICCBA presents a cost-
effective, efficient, and pragmatic manner to do so the will improve the 
Court’s “overall fairness” and protect the equality of arms.
